The objectives pursued by governments managing fisheries may include maximizing profits, minimizing the impact on the marine ecosystem, or securing employment, which all require adjusting the composition of the fishing fleet. We develop a management plan that can be adapted to those objectives and allows the regulator to compare the long-run profits between the various management options. We apply the model to the case of Northeast Arctic cod, and estimate the cost and harvesting functions of various vessel types, the demand function, and a biological model to provide key insights regarding the optimal management of this valuable fish species. 
I. Introduction
Fisheries management has never been easy, but today's challenges are larger than ever before.
Globally, 80 percent of marine fish stocks are maximally exploited or even overexploited (FAO, 2008) , and several stocks have already collapsed (Jackson et al., 2001) . At the same time, more people rely on seafood as a major source of protein, especially in developing countries (Smith et al., 2010) . Sustainability may rank high on the policy makers' agenda, but the profitability of the fisheries sector does so too, and the same holds for employment opportunities. As these objectives can never be fully achieved simultaneously, there is a tendency among economists to focus on one single easy objective (maximum economic rent), while deemphasizing the importance of the other objectives (Dichmont et al., 2010; Grafton et al., 2010; Grafton et al., 2007) . Therefore, it has been suggested that successful fisheries management is largely a question about transparency and congruency of objectives (Dankel et al., 2008; Hilborn, 2007; Squires, 2009 ). In principle, there are two potential ways to give policy recommendations when facing multiple objectives; see Banzhaf (2009) . The first approach assumes that the relative shadow prices of financial, environmental and social objectives are known so that their weighted sum can be maximized. The second is that the researcher just presents the trade-offs and leaves it to the policy process to decide what actions foster social welfare.
In this paper we take the second approach as we analyze how a fishery should be managed in the light of multiple policy objectives. We identify the optimal fleet structure for various objectives by maximizing economic rent with and without explicit constraints on fleet activitydepending on environmental or social considerations. We apply our analysis to one of the world's most important fisheries: the stock of Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Northeast Arctic, along 3 the coast of Norway and in the Barents Sea. This is the world's largest stock of cod, and the history of the Northeast Arctic (NEA) cod fishery since World War II is one of continued increases in landings, suddenly giving way to a near collapse of the fishery in 1989. In response to the cod crisis, a management regime was introduced that imposed a fishing quota on each ocean-going vessel in the industry. The question is how to allocate those quotas most efficiently and -even more important -how to set a total allowable catch (TAC) to prevent another cod crisis while meeting broader management objectives. Fisheries management in Norway has a long tradition and regulations and management objectives have changed considerably over time (Årland and Bjørndal, 2002; Hannesson, 2004; Hersoug, 2005; Holm, 1995; Nakken et al., 1996) . Årland and Bjørndal (2002) have identified the main objectives of Norwegian fisheries regulations as (i) increasing the profitability of the fisheries sector, (ii) protecting the resource base, and (iii) securing employment opportunities in coastal communities to maintain the settlements along the coast.
In this paper we determine the optimal TAC as well as the most efficient allocation of individual catch quotas over the various types of fishing vessels for various management objectives: (i) we analyze the scenario that the policy maker intends to maximize simply the rents from the fishery -harvesting should take place at lowest costs.
(ii) we consider the case that a policy maker maximizes rents on the condition that only boats are used that have least impact on the ecosystem. (iii) we take into account that a diverse fleet is preferred (for the sake of regional development and cultural diversity). For all of these objectives, we determine the optimal TAC as well as the most efficient allocation of individual catch quotas over the various types of fishing vessels for various management objectives including maximization of the rents of cod harvesting. 4 Although the stock of NEA cod lies within the exclusive economic zones of both Russia and Norway, we focus our analysis on the Norwegian fishing fleet of ocean-going vessels, because it consists of a wide variety of boat types including trawlers, factory trawlers and longliners (Sandberg, 2006; Standal, 2008) . Hence, determining the optimal fleet composition for the various management objectives is complex. We develop an analytical model to derive the optimal levels of biomass and the associated TAC, and estimate all parameters of the model using data on the NEA cod fishery. More specifically, we estimate the cost and production functions of the various vessel types in the industry (trawlers, longliners and factory trawlers), the demand function for cod (to determine how its value changes with quantity supplied), as well as the parameters of the growth function of cod.
This study has several unique features. First of all, it takes into account the many problems associated with estimating the harvesting, cost, growth and demand functions including serial correlation and endogeneity. In this respect we improve on the earlier work by Arnason et al. (2004) and Kugarajh et al. (2006) in estimating the demand function for cod, and by explicitly acknowledging that there are not only variable costs associated with harvesting cod, but that there are fixed costs too (Asche, 2009) . Second, we combine the empirically estimated functions into a model which allows policy makers to infer (i) the steady-state levels of biomass that maximize their objectives (either unconstrained rent maximization, or rent maximizations taking into account environmental and/or social constraints), (ii) the associated optimal TAC and the allocating thereof over the various vessel types, and (iii) the optimal harvest control rule (HCR) that informs the decision maker about the optimal TAC and its allocation over the boat types for every level of biomass -independent of whether it is the optimal steady-state stock, or not. Third, our study also provides a flexible framework to include constraints regarding the supply side of 5 fleet composition -the fact that a cost-minimizing long-run strategy cannot be implemented instantaneously, as boats that operate at lower costs cannot replace more costly ones in the shortrun. As a result, our model provides an important bridge between analytical fisheries models that have little empirical content, and highly detailed econometric studies that do not deliver any direct policy advice.
While an optimal allocation between the coastal and the ocean-going fleet has received some attention in the literature (Armstrong, 1999 (Armstrong, , 2000 Armstrong and Sumaila, 2001) , the size of an optimal individual quota per boat is usually not addressed. This is somewhat surprising,
given that the question how to allocate a TAC over a certain number of boats is one of the most obvious management problems a fishery faces. An exception is Asche et al. (2009) who have addressed this question for the Norwegian trawler fleet. In most bioeconomic models individual boats do not exist -often costs are estimated at the aggregated level and hence, the fleet can only be analyzed as one entity; see Bromley (2009) . This is an obvious shortcoming, as increasing and decreasing returns to scale operate at the boat level -not at the industry level. It is sometimes argued that a policy maker does not need to worry about how to distribute harvesting rights because a market for individually tradable quotas will ensure the efficient allocation (Grafton et al., 2006; Hannesson, 2004) . We would like to note that this is not true for two reasons. First, the total quota size to be allocated (via grandfathering, or via auctions) crucially depends not just on the benefits of selling cod (in terms of revenues obtained), but also on the costs of harvesting it.
While the benefits only depend on the quantity supplied to the market (i.e., on the TAC), the costs critically depend on the composition of the fishing fleet as some boat types are more efficient in catching cod than others. Hence, while a system of ITQs may ensure that actual harvesting takes place at minimum cost, we still need to know how the minimum cost solution 6 looks like in order to decide on the level of the TAC itself. Second, even if ITQs result in fishing activity that operates at least costs, such an outcome would only be socially optimal if society had no other objectives than just minimizing harvesting costs. In reality, broader objectives, such as ecosystem preservation, the cultural value of a diverse fleet, or equity considerations, are pursued. Therefore, in this case detailed information on the various vessel types is needed to be able to determine whether or not certain boat types should be prohibited from purchasing ITQs.
Management of the NEA cod fishery is inherently complex, and any useful model -as the one developed here -has inevitably to sacrifice certain details. First of all, this study ignores important ecosystem effects. At the end of the year, the mature fish migrate out of the Barents Sea for about 3 months to spawn, returning to the feeding grounds in spring. The cod eggs drift up along the Norwegian coast and the immature fish stay in the feeding grounds until maturation when they start reproducing. Obviously management could be substantially improved by acknowledging the age-structure and the productivity of the stock (Diekert et al., 2010a; Sumaila, 1997a) . Second, and in a similar vein, the fact that older cod tend to cannibalize on younger cod may have management implications that are ignored here (Armstrong, 2000; Armstrong and Sumaila, 2001 ). Third, if harvesting pressure is very high this may induce an evolutionary response that leads to economic repercussions (Eikeset et al., 2010b are two of the most important fish species the cod interacts with (Hjermann et al., 2007) . Herring feeds on capelin larvae (Gjøsaeter and Bogstad, 1998) and is therefore competing with the cod for the prey species capelin. We ignore this effect in this paper, but see (Link and Tol, 2006; Sumaila, 1997b) . Fifth, climate plays also an important role in this ecosystem. If new species 7 immigrate from the south, this leads to a new food-web structure (Ottersen et al., 2006) .
Examples of bioeconomic models that have analyzed how climate may affect the management of cod are Hannesson (2007b) and Link and Tol (2009) . A study that takes both climate change and multiple species into account is Eide and Heen (2002) . Sixth, climate change may also affect the negotiations and the legitimacy of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fishery Commission. If the climate gets warmer, this may trigger capelin to migrate further into Russian waters in which the cod may follow (Roderfeld et al., 2008) . Our analysis does not touch upon such strategic interactions, as we assume that the management authority in place sets and enforces the quota;
see for examples of strategic games regarding the NEA cod fishery, Diekert et al. (2010b) , Hannesson (2007a) , and Sumaila (1997a; 1997b) .
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present an overview of the NEA cod fishery. Section 3 develops the optimal management plans for a variety of management objectives. We estimate the model in section 4, presenting the parameterizations of the production, cost, and demand functions as well as of the biological model. Next, section 5 combines the theoretical and empirical results and derives an optimal policy, while section 6 concludes.
II. The Northeast Arctic cod Fishery
The NEA cod fishery consists of two parts that are geographically separate: the feeding grounds in the Barents Sea, and the spawning grounds further south along the coast of Norway.
Norwegians have been fishing for over thousands of years in predominantly the spawning grounds because of their proximity to villages and ports. Since the 1930s (and especially after the second world war), technological developments facilitated the use of large ocean-going trawlers in the feeding grounds in the Barents Sea, which resulted in an increase in fishing pressure 8 (Godø, 2003) . Until the early 1970s the number of trawlers steadily increased and landings have been as high as one million tonnes per annum -for some years, the harvesting probability for individual fish was as high as 70% per year (Eikeset, 2010) .
In the late 1970s it became clear that the NEA cod fishery was overexploited; see Figure 1 .
In 1977 the Norwegian government responded by starting to actively enforce the country's exclusive economic zone and by barring the entry of new trawlers (Standal and Aarset, 2008) .
Also, a cap was introduced on the total amount of cod caught per year (the so-called total allowable catch, or TAC). Unfortunately, the TACs in the 1980s were too lenient to prevent the cod crisis that occurred in 1989 -especially because the cod was under severe stress already due to the population collapse of one of its main prey species, capelin. As a consequence the TAC in 1989 had to be reduced dramatically with disastrous consequences for the cod fishing industry (Hersoug et al., 2000) . To deal with the crisis, a system was introduced that gave each ocean-going vessel in the industry a quota to catch a certain amount of cod. These quotas were non-transferable at first, but later on the regulations were revised to allow vessels to transfer harvesting rights (Hersoug et al., 2000; Holm and Nielsen, 2007; Standal and Aarset, 2008) . Currently, the fishery is managed by the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fishery
Commission as the feeding grounds of NEA cod (in the Barents Sea) are located in the exclusive economic zones of both countries.
III. The optimal management of the cod fishery
We assume the government aims to maximize the net present value of economic rents as the soleowner of the resource. Because about 90% of the cod is exported, rent maximization can best be described by maximizing profits -consumer surplus can be ignored because the Norwegian government is likely to attach little weight to the consumer welfare accruing to citizens outside Norway (but see footnote 9). However, we acknowledge that society may have broader objectives than just maximizing rents from harvesting cod. These other considerations may be related to environmental concerns (as some boat types are more damaging to the marine ecosystem than others) or social-cultural concerns (the desire to maintain a diverse fleet because of cultural considerations). Therefore, we assume that the government aims to maximize Norway's rents of cod harvesting while it may or may not decide to impose constraints on the type of vessels used to address these other considerations too.
Deriving an optimal TAC
We derive the optimal management plan for three different management objectives. First, we solve the problem assuming that society chooses to use a fleet that is able to harvest a specific amount of cod, the TAC, at least total costs. Second, we consider the case in which society imposes additional constraints on the fleet composition in order to protect the marine environment by banning trawlers and factory trawlers, since they are deemed more destructive to the ecosystem than longliners (Dayton et al., 1995) . The third case we consider is the one where the government, motivated by employment or cultural considerations, decides to maintain a diverse fleet by allocating harvesting rights to a variety of vessel types in the industry -as is currently done in the Norwegian cod fishery. Throughout the paper, we follow Salvanes and Squires (1995) by assuming that all boats of a specific type are identical.
The instantaneous flow of economic profits, , t Π is specified as follows 
where dots denote time derivatives, δ is the discount rate, and ( ) G X is the growth function of the cod stock, which is assumed to be logistic:
where r is the intrinsic population growth rate, and K is the maximum amount of cod biomass that would materialize in the long run absent harvesting -the so-called carrying capacity. The current-value Hamiltonian H is then given by
where ϕ is the co-state variable.
Using the dynamics of the resource stock [4] and applying the maximum principle, we obtain the following first-order conditions for an optimum:
1 Partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts, and hence / .
In the rest of the paper we omit time subscripts unless doing so could cause confusion. 12 0 2 ,
To derive the steady-state optimum, we set 0
As shown in [9] , the optimal TAC depends on the cost function, and hence on the composition of the fleet -as not all vessel types are likely to be equally efficient in catching cod. While X C (the stock effect) is transmitted through all vessels that are in operation, TAC C (the cost of catching an additional tonne of cod) is only transmitted through the marginal vessel type: the type that is the last to receive a quota if these quotas are handed out starting with the most preferred type. This difference is important if more than one vessel type is in use for catching cod. If only one boat type is operated in the cod fishery, deriving TAC C and X C is straightforward. This may be the case because one vessel type outperforms all other types in a specific aspect -one type may be able to harvest at lower costs than the others, or one type may have smaller environmental impacts than any of the other types. If, however, more than one type is used in the fishery (because the government values a diverse fleet because of social or cultural considerations, or because it faces constraints regarding the number of vessels of the preferred type), the stock effect X C shows the impact of having an extra tonne of biomass on all vessels (of all types used) in the fishery. TAC C on the other hand only pertains to the marginal boat type as defined above. Furthermore, because the optimal TAC depends on the composition of the fishing fleet, so does the optimal steady-state biomass, which can be determined by substituting [4] into [9] and solving for . X Having 13 determined the optimal stock and harvesting levels, we can also calculate economic rent (as measured by economic profits).
While steady-state biomass and harvest levels are interesting in itself, they are often not very useful for management purposes, as in reality the stock will never be in steady state.
Therefore, we derive a harvest control rule (HCR) that informs the decision maker about the optimal TAC for any given stock level. A feedback HCR can be determined relatively easily following Sandal and Steinshamn (1997a; ; see for applications Arnason et al. (2004) or Grafton et al. (2000) . From [7] it follows that the co-state variable ϕ can be rewritten as a function of the state and the control variable (X and TAC, respectively). If the discount rate is zero, the Hamiltonian is constant over time, and maximizing the current-value Hamiltonian boils down to maximizing the profit flow (as defined in [1] ) that can be obtained in a steady state, also referred to as the sustainable economic rent * ( ) X Π (Sandal and Steinshamn, 2001) . 3 We thus obtain the following analytical feedback rule:
see Appendix 1 for the exact derivation. Both * ( ) X Π and TAC C depend on the fleet structure. In section 5, we show how much the optimal long-term policy given by [9] and short-term policy given by [10] are affected by the chosen fleet structure.
Deriving the optimal quota allocation for each individual vessel type
Suppose that currently there are Z different types of vessels used in the industry, such as trawlers, factory trawlers, and longliners. Furthermore, in this subsection we also assume that boats can freely enter or leave the cod fishery at no cost -an assumption that will be relaxed later. [12]
Let us first determine, for each vessel type z, the optimal effort level per boat * z e , and also the optimal number of boats
For future reference, it is convenient to note that [14a] implies that the shadow price is equal to the vessel's average costs of catching cod fish: 
Next, substituting [16] into [14c], we find that the optimal number of boats of type z is equal to
The larger the amount of biomass, the more productive is a boat of type z, and hence the fewer boats are needed to harvest a specific TAC. So, combining [17] and [18] we identify that the harvesting costs of all boats of type z operating at the efficient scale are equal to 
Determining the optimal allocation of vessel quotas
We analyze the case where the government (i) chooses to use a fleet that operates at lowest costs (potentially the result of a market mechanism like an ITQ system in which boats of all types are allowed to participate) or (ii) takes broader objectives into account and imposes fleet constraints. This approach allows the government to calculate the costs associated with imposing an allocation of quotas other than the allocation that minimizes harvesting costs. The difference in 18 economic profits indicates the costs to society for not using the cost-minimizing vector of shares so that these costs can subsequently be compared, explicitly or implicitly, to the environmental or social benefits obtained, to decide whether the benefits of these decisions exceed their costs.
While allocation of quotas between several fleet types is not necessarily cost-minimizing (as it may be determined by other policy objectives than just maximizing financial welfare), the quota allocation within a fleet is still assumed to be optimal -and given by the number of tonnage-days boats spend catching cod for the boat type that is considered least harmful (and zero shares to all other vessel types). In short, the government can simply insert the vector of harvesting shares it deems optimal into [21] to obtain the associated harvesting cost function.
Optimal quota allocation in case of fleet lock-in
In the previous sub-section, we have shown that it is cost-minimizing to use only the vessel type that has the lowest average costs. In practice, one is typically confronted with a situation where boats of a specific type cannot easily replace vessels of a different type. Instead, the fleet 19 composition can only be changed in the short run at substantial costs -a situation which we will refer to as a fleet lock-in. 
IV.
An empirical application of the Northeast Arctic cod fishery
In this section we estimate the production and cost function from individual vessel data from the Directorate of Fisheries (Bergen, Norway). Next, since the NEA cod fishery is not a small scale fishery, its landings affect the price at which Norway exports cod -and hence also the landing prices. We empirically derive the percentage decrease in the landing price (or ex-vessel price)
resulting from a one percent increase in the quantity of cod harvested -i.e., the inverse of the 21 price elasticity of demand, sometimes also referred to as the price flexibility. Finally, we estimate the biological model for the NEA cod stock. All data sources are described in Appendix 3.
Estimating the production and the cost function
To estimate the cost and production functions of the various boat types, we use panel data from the period 1990-2000, which covers almost all ocean-going vessels that were active in the cod fishery in that time period. We have data on the quantity of cod harvested, days spent on catching cod and on the costs incurred per year for 107 trawlers, 25 factory trawlers, and 85 longliners.
Most vessels have not reported for all of the 11 years; see Sandberg (2006) for more information on the data. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of the data that will be used in the regression analysis. In economics, the relationship between inputs and output (the production function) is often inferred by estimating a cost function ( , ) z C X TAC using a flexible form. This approach is based 22 on the assumption that whatever amount of fish a boat has caught, it has done so at minimum cost. In such a case duality applies (Varian, 1992, Chapter 6 ) and the production function can be inferred from the prices of the inputs and outputs. The advantages of this approach are that one does not need to assume a certain technological structure a priori (as we did in [11] ) and also that it is statistically more efficient because the cost function and the first-order condition for cost minimization can be estimated jointly. In fisheries economics, this approach is less appealing because of several reasons. First of all, the standard cost function approach cannot be applied because one of the inputs in the production process, biomass, cannot be chosen freely by individual fishermen, and introducing quasi-fixed factors in the cost function typically complicates the estimation procedure considerably (Morrison, 1988; Morrison and Schwartz, 1996; van Soest et al., 2006) . Second, fishermen are unlikely to always operate at minimum costs at all times. Markets are usually incomplete, fishermen face informational constraints, and payments of all inputs are not always determined by market prices directly because crew members may receive shares of the harvesting revenues rather than a fixed wage (McConnell and Price, 2006; Sandberg, 2006) . Finally, it is not necessarily the case that all fishermen always try to maximize profits because other considerations (including status seeking) may also play a role (Gezelius, 2007; Ginkel, 2009; Holland, 2008; Poos, 2010; Salas and Gaertner, 2004 
Estimating the production function of the three vessel types
First, we estimate the production function for each fleet type z given in [11] . Table 1 shows that the ocean-going cod fleet consists of three types: trawlers (47.8% of the boats), factory trawlers (18.5%), and longliners (33.7%). We denote these three boats types by z = T, z = FT, and z = LL,
respectively. In our model, effort izt e is defined as the number of days a boat is fishing cod north of 62 degrees latitude, multiplied by its size (GRT). Including the size of the boat takes differences in operational intensity into account ). We cannot rule out an omitted variable bias -caused for example by differences in the skillfulness of individual skippers (Sandberg, 2006; Squires and Kirkley, 1999) . This poses a particular problem if the "skipper effect" is positively correlated with the size of the boat, which may be the case if the best skippers run the largest boats. Therefore, we estimate the model by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with fixed effects on the cross-sections (that is, we use vessel-specific fixed effects). As our number of cross-sections is much larger than the number of years, we use a robust variance-covariance matrix that produces panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), as proposed by Beck and Katz (1995 
Estimating the cost function of the three vessel types
We estimate the fixed and variable costs of harvesting cod (as specified by [12] 
The inverse price elasticity of Northeast Arctic cod
Estimating the inverse demand function for cod (see [2] ) is complicated, because the price and quantity data are equilibrium outcomes of market interactions, and hence are the result of both demand and supply. In particular there may still be supply effects if (i) the manager decides on the TAC in an ad hoc manner and may set higher quotas when world prices are high, (ii) there is a tendency to harvest illegally when prices are high, or (iii) the quotas are not fully exercised when prices are really low. Because of these reasons we use Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), instrumenting for landings in the first stage of 2SLS using biomass levels of the past two years as instruments.
We estimate the inverse elasticity of demand -the price flexibility -using export-prices. In the NEA-cod fishery, ex-vessel prices and export prices are co-integrated (Asche et al., 2002) , and therefore one can use the price flexibility to construct a demand function for the ex-vessel fish market. While in our theoretical model we assume the demand function for cod to be linear, econometrically it is preferred to estimate the demand function using a log-linear specification.
Hence, our regression model is The biological model
We use a discrete version of the biological model (see [4] and [5] ) to estimate the population growth function for the NEA cod:
where the error term t ε is expected to follow an autoregressive (AR) process. Here, 0 a yields the point estimate for the intrinsic population growth rate r, and 0 b is our point estimate for 1 / . K Concerning serial correlation, three different models are considered: model M1 is estimated without an AR term, M2 is estimated as an AR (1) process, and M3 is estimated as an AR (2) process. The results are presented in Table 4 
The total biomass that supports a maximum sustainable yield (MSY) thus equals 5.41/ 2 2.7 = million tonnes of cod, and the associated MSY is equal to 743,000 tonnes. 
V. Using the empirical results for an optimal policy
We can now use the estimates obtained in section 4 to derive the optimal quota sizes per vessel of each type, the optimal amount of biomass, and the associated economic rents as indicated in section 3. We start by calculating the optimal scale of operation (as measured in tonnage-days)
for each of the three vessel types (see [16] ), and also the optimal number of fishing days (by dividing [16] by the average GRT of the boat type). We find that the optimal number of days fishing cod for the three boat types varies between 62 for longliners and 238 for trawlers; see Table 5 . This is more than the time the boats spend currently catching cod (see Table 1 ) -consistent with intuition because the current situation is most likely characterized by overcapacity. Table 5 . Optimal number of days fishing cod for different boat types, as measured by days and tonnage days.
We now turn to the question how to set an optimal TAC. First, we present results for the situation where the fleet composition is flexible, and without an upper limit on the number of boats that can be used. We start by calculating the average costs of harvesting one kilogram of cod for each of the three vessel types, as given by [20] . At a given level of remaining biomass equal to X, the costs equal of all boats belonging to one fleet type; see [19] . Furthermore, we find that trawlers have always 30 lower average harvesting costs than factory trawlers (when both are operating at their efficient scales), for all levels of biomass between 0 and K.
7 Similarly, trawlers have lower average harvesting costs than longliners, as long as biomass is 530,000 tonnes or higher. In the analysis that follows, it is shown that if biomass is below this level, it will be desirable to stop fishing altogether. Therefore, we can conclude that -if fishing takes place -trawlers are always the costminimizing option; LC1 = T.
Next, we use our model to determine the optimal long run equilibrium values for biomass, TAC, and fleet profits for the various management objectives; see Table 6 . Three scenarios will be compared. First, the government minimizes fleet costs and allocates all quotas to trawlers (potentially through an ITQ mechanism). Second, the government not only cares about economic rents but pursues environmental objectives too. In this scenario the government therefore only allows longliners to enter the cod fishery, as they are more environmentally-friendly than trawlers. Third, we solve for the case where the government also has other objectives (like cultural and social considerations), embodied by assuming that society prefers a diverse fleet as it is today.
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The results are presented in Table 6 . First, we find that discounting has a negligible impact on optimal long run policies -the optimal biomass levels for a discount rate of zero percent are less than two percent smaller than for a discount rate of ten percent. Second, independent of the fleet composition, we find that the optimal biomass is always larger than the MSY stock of 2.7
7 In our analysis we ignore the fact that factory trawlers create added value by processing the fish on board. That means that our regression results underestimate the benefits (or overestimated the costs) from using factory trawlers that produce frozen fish fillet rather than raw fish. Therefore, it seems unfair to compare them with the other boats. Hence, factory trawlers will be omitted from the rest of the analysis, except in the scenario where a diverse fleet is preferred by society. 8 Since our dataset comprises almost all ocean-going vessels that are engaged in the cod fishery, we derive the parameters from our dataset. That is 0.478, 0.185, 0.337.
million tonnes of cod. Hence, search costs and market power outweigh the impact of discounting (even when using a discount rate of 10%), as the optimum is always on the right hand side of the logistic growth function. Third, we find that the optimal biomass is smallest in the case fleet profits are maximized and the cheapest boats -trawlers -are used (and hence the amount of cod caught is largest). And the remaining biomass is largest in case of environmental concerns, when the government only allows cod harvesting to take place by longliners. 9 Our results are similar to results obtained for the same cod stock by Armstrong (1999) , who found a TAC of 650,000
tonnes to be optimal and Armstrong and Sumaila (2000) who found an optimal TAC of 450,000
tonnes. Table 6 . Optimal steady-state biomass and harvest levels for several harvesting scenarios for maximizing rents (using only trawlers), environmental concerns (using only longliners), and cultural diversity (using trawlers, factory trawlers, and longliners).
9 Recall that we assume the government to maximize economic profits (with or without constraints on the type of boats used) because more than 90% of NEA cod is exported. If the government not only cares about economic profits but also about consumer surplus (and hence aims to maximize social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and economic profits, the optimal steady-state biomass is 3.14 mln tonnes with an associated TAC of 0.72 mln tonnes (trawlers), 3.33 mln and 0.70 mln tonnes (longliners), and 3.20 and 0.72 mln tonnes (mixed fleet). For the HCR, we find that maximizing profits leads to somewhat smoother harvesting activity than maximizing the sum of profits and consumer surplus (as harvesting is continued at lower biomass levels, but not as aggressive at higher biomass levels). Then, the minimum biomass levels would be around 1.5 million tonnes.
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So we find that the optimal biomass levels are much higher than the biomass levels that we are currently experiencing; see Figure First, we find that the optimal HCR is concave: a one percent decrease in the remaining biomass calls for a more than proportional decrease in the quantity harvested. Second, we find that the minimum biomass level, below which all fishing activities should be ceased, is higher for trawlers than for longliners -as trawlers are getting relative inefficient at low biomass levels (see the stock-output elasticity in Table 2 ). Third, we find that at higher biomass levels, it would be optimal to harvest more with a fleet of trawlers compared to longliners. Fourth, we find that just allowing longliners to enter the fishery is quite expensive as the annual profits are 2 bln NOK 33 smaller than in case the fishery is managed to maximize rents, and allowing for a diverse fleet reduces profits by 0.9 bln NOK. Hence, the manager needs to decide whether the benefits of pursuing environmental objectives or cultural objectives exceed these costs.
The minimum biomass levels we find are similar to the ones found by Arnason et al. (2004) , who start fishing at 1.3 million tonnes of biomass, and Kugarajh et al. (2006) who found it optimal to start fishing at around one million tonnes of biomass. In these studies, harvesting was never higher than around 500,000 tonnes (Arnason et al., 2004) and 750,000 tonnes (Kugarajh et al., 2006) .
If the situation is characterized by fleet lock-in, it is not necessarily possible to follow the cost-minimizing policy identified in Table 6 . If the optimal TAC of 590,000 tonnes needs to be and a large number of longliners. 10 Plugging in all estimated parameters into [20] we find that it is cheapest to let trawlers operate 365 days a year, before using longliners if biomass levels are above 600,000 tonnes (cf.
[23]). Therefore, if the manager aims to maximize the rents from cod harvesting, she should force all 90 trawlers to operate the whole year. In addition, it is then optimal to also have 97 longliners active in the cod fishing industry, each of which operates at its efficient scale (see the third line in equation [23] and Table 7) . Surprisingly, the optimal amount of biomass is then larger than when using just trawlers or longliners (and hence the TAC is smaller, given that the optimal biomass lies on the right hand side of the logistic growth curve);
compare Tables 6 and 7 . The explanation for this counter-intuitive finding is that using additional longliners will negatively affect the efficiency of trawlers through the stock effect. At lower biomass levels, trawlers are getting less efficient than longliners (see the estimates of the stockoutput elasticities ( ) z α presented in Table 2, and [9] ). This indirect cost explains why it is optimal to use less longliners -given that the trawler fleet is already operating at maximum capacity. 
VI. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we developed a management plan to determine the optimal steady-state biomass, TAC, and the associated economic rents for three different management objectives for the NEA cod fishery. Our model allows the decision maker to determine the optimal allocation of a TAC over the various types of vessels currently used in the fishery (trawlers, longliners and factory trawlers). Having derived the associated cost functions of catching cod, the information can subsequently be used to determine the optimal steady state level of biomass, as well as the harvesting trajectory towards it (the so-called HCR). All equations of the model have been estimated using detailed data of the NEA cod fishery, while addressing the many statistical difficulties associated with them.
Our analysis shows that fleet structure is important for optimal policy as it determines not only how many boats optimally harvest a given TAC, but also the size of the overall TAC and the associated optimal biomass levels. Taking the cost structure of the industry into account affects 35 the optimal biomass levels substantially, as the steady-state stock is 3.94 million tonnes in the case the government aims to maximize long-run financial welfare (implying that the fishing fleet should consist of trawlers only, because they are most efficient in harvesting) while it is 4.35 million tonnes if the government aims to maximize long-run profit while limiting the fleet structure to consist of longliners only -as they are indicated to impose least damages to the marine ecosystem. These results can be used by the decision maker to decide how to set an optimal TAC, to choose which vessels are allowed to participate in the fishery, and assess the costs of deviating from the least-cost approach.
Some model assumptions deserve special attention, as they may have potential policy implications. First, we assume cod growth to be represented by a simple logistic growth model.
Adding more biological realism may alter our results; see Eikeset et al. (2010a) for a study that uses a more complex biological model to determine optimal HCRs. While the way in which the cost structure of different vessel types affect the management plan would carry over to a more complex biological model, the specific optima -such as the size of optimal biomass or the TAC -will probably be different. Second, we focus our analysis on cod harvesting ignoring all economic and ecological interactions with other fish species (Nøstbakken, 2006; Salvanes and Squires, 1995; Squires et al., 1998 ). An interesting further avenue would be to investigate how the economies of scale that we identified in this paper relate to economics of scope (i.e. the possibility to catch other fish species). Third, we assume that each fleet can be represented by a typical boat. In reality, a fleet comprises many boats that differ in age, size, productivity, and costs. This is not accounted for in our model, giving rise to inefficiencies when quotas are distributed over boats. These inefficiencies could be eliminated by an ITQ mechanism (within the fleet constraints that we have outlined), even though the costs and disadvantages of such a 36 mechanism can easily outweigh the potential benefits (Sumaila, 2010) . Fourth, while our results
give optimal quotas in tonnage-days, in practice it would be desirable to hand out the actual quotas -transferable or not -as catch shares to remove the incentive to substitute controlled for uncontrolled capital. Finally, analyzing the cost of building up and maintaining fishing capacity was beyond the scope of this paper, but would be worth exploring.
The study presented here is novel, as it provides an optimal management plan that is flexible and can be adapted to various policy objectives concerning the utilization of the fleet going beyond cost-minimization. However, it can only be considered as a first step towards optimal management of natural resources that recognizes the full array of preferences society holds regarding how these resources should be exploited.
Appendix 1: Deriving an analytical harvest control rule
Deriving an harvest control rule (HCR) is fairly straightforward if the discount rate is assumed to be equal to 0 ( ) 0 ; δ = see Sandal and Steinshamn (1997a; . The current-value Hamiltonian of the optimal control problem in section 3 can be written in general terms as follows: [ ] is again estimated with fixed effects. The results are presented in Table A1 . We find a stock-output elasticity smaller than one and an effort-output elasticity smaller than zero, which is consistent with our earlier findings. In order to judge the quality of each model, we will assess their forecasting ability. European income is proxied by real European GDP (Maddison, 2010) . The data has been corrected for inflation, and has been converted from US Dollar into Norwegian Kroner using exchange rates from the OECD (2010). The KG price for cod is given by the off-boat sales prices ("Førstehåndspris") as given by the Directories of Fisheries, Bergen (Fiskedirektoratet, 2007) . To make the price data comparable with the costs data we have used, again, the producer price index from the OECD. The baseline year was as before 2000. The average KG price is the average price between 1997 and 2007.
